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AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POWER 
I 
What does" social power" or, more simply, .. power" 
mean? The adjective" social" merely means" between men" 
or .. among the people." Accordingly, power, as I use the 
word here, does not imply mere individual effort, potentiality 
or ability. It means the ability of a certain person or group 
of persons to act, in some way or other, on another person 
or group of persons. How, then, ought this action to be 
interpreted? On this point, opinions may differ. 
Power means the ability of one subject to act in any way 
on another. This is the concept of power as it is viewed 
from the standpoint of the first·mentioned acting subject. 
When we view the same circumstance in the light of a 
mutual relationship-one side acting and the other side be· 
ing acted upon-we are dealing with relations of power. In 
other words, when we refer to relations of power, it means 
that the same circumstance is viewed in the light of a 
mutual relationship; and when we speak of power, we are 
dealing with that side only which acts on the other. A 
relation of power, if viewed from one angle, means a rela· 
tionship of superiority or higher status, while from the 
opposite angle, it means a relationship of subordination. 
What action is it, then, which is under discussion? It 
is the action, conscious or unconscious, of one subject to 
influence the will of another subject in the direction of its 
own will; it is, so to speak, the action to shape the will of 
others. Power is thus no other than the ability to shape the 
will of others in the direction of one's own will. If it is 
obedience that one allows one's will to be determined by 
others, power means the ability to gain obedience. This 
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ability does not, however, represent empty probability. It is 
an ability which is based on a mutual emotional attitude", 
or, in other words, a capacity embodying mutual preparation . 
.. The determination of wiII " requires some analytic explana-
tion. The will of others can be determined in two ways-
one positive and the other negative. One method is to direct 
the wiII of others in such a way that it does not take any 
definite shape. This is, in a sense, an attempt to make 
others abstain from offering resistance to the execution 
of one's own wiII. It is to keep others from having the 
wiII to resist, or, in case they have such a will, to make 
them give it up. The other method is to cause others to 
have a will exactly such as one dictates. That is to say, 
they are sometimes required to leave their will indefinite, 
and at other times are required to shape it in a certain 
definite way. In the latter case, the requirement is not 
negative, but positive. When the requirement is thus 
positive, the will of others is dictatorially commanded to 
conform with the prescribed form. We have a typical case 
of the will of others under dictation where the relations 
inherent in ruling operate. 
Now, let me examine representative theories on the 
nature of power. To quote Friedrich von Wieser. to begin 
with. Wieser, citing Spinoza's interpretation, contends that 
power means control over human sentiment. He says that 
the power of a man over his friend or the power of a man 
over one whom he loves which is nothing other than a kind 
of power in society, operates through the medium of senti-
ment. Legal power, the power of faith and knowledge, and 
moral power are all nothing more than pressure operating 
on sentiment. Even external power, such as military force, 
is no exception to the rule. It constitutes power for no 
other reason than that it controls the sentiment of the people 
by oppressing them, Wieser says". Is this interpretation of 
power acceptable, however? In my opinion, it is wrong to 
1) Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. p. 28. 
2) Wieser. Gesetz der Macht. 1926, p. 5. 
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regard power as control over human sentiment. It will be 
impossible even for a despot or a conqueror to control the 
sentiment of his rebellious subjects or that of a conquered 
people who are bitter against him because of his despotic 
authority or his armed forces. In such cases, control over 
sentiment is impossible, though nobody will deny that the 
despot or the conqueror has mighty power. Control over 
the sentiment of other is very remarkable when, for instance, 
a very able actor is performing before an audience or when 
a beautiful woman is in the company of her admirers. Such 
an actor or beautiful woman will be able to excite in his 
audience or in her admirers any sentiment that he or she 
likes. But in such cases, we do not say that his or her 
social power is strong. 
To translate von Wieser's words .. die Herrschaft iiber 
das menschliche Gemiit" into .. control over sentiment" is, 
perhaps, to put too narrow an interpretation on its meaning. 
He interprets internal power as .. die Beziehung auf das 
Gemiit, auf das seelische Fiihlen und Wollen."" Anyhow, 
it is indisputable that control over sentiment forms the 
nucleus of Wieser's concept of power. 
Now as to Max Weber's concept of power, which has 
fairly wide support. According to him, power (Macht) covers 
all possibilities or capabilities (die Chance) of carrying out 
one's will in social relations in the face of opposition." 
Ruling (Herrschaftl, as against power, has attributes calling 
for more definite definition. Ruling is the ability to secure 
obedience to order. Weber's theory is open to criticism on 
the following several points. In the first place, the capacity 
he describes is not really one based on social relations. 
Social power must necessarily be based on social relations, 
and must consequently represent some definite adaptations 
or attitudes on the part of the individuals concerned. Next, 
whereas control (die Herrschaft) must be one form of power 
or one special manifestation of power, the connection between 
3) op. cit .• p. 5. 
4) Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellsc;;haft. p. 28. 
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the two is not clearly defined. If ruling implies obedience, 
power must also rest on obedience. In Weber's theory, how-
ever, power is defined without reference to obedience, that 
is, the attitude of those on whom it operates: it is defined 
by execlusive reference to attitude of the acting subject. It 
is true that Weber's theory is free from the objection to 
which von Wieser's theory-which makes sentiment the 
centre of the concept of power-is open, but it is impossible 
to accept his contention that the action of power lies in its 
triumph over resistance. In the case of the so-called internal 
power (innere Macht), the party on whom power acts rather 
voluntarily desires the execution of his will on the part of 
the subject acting with power. In this instance, there is no 
resistance whatever. (The execution of one's will where there 
is no resistance is a thing of common occurrence between 
individuals who are on an equal footing). To define power 
as the ability try carry out one's will in the face of opposi-
tion is to put too narrow a construction on power. External 
power (iiussere Macht) may be explained in this way, but 
not other power. Oppenheimer puts a narrow interpretation 
on the term "in social relations", in this case to attempt to 
exclude relations of military force, pure and simple."" Some 
other scholars interpret power in a more or less analogous 
manner_ If, however, social relations are to be regarded as 
relations between men, that is, human relationship, it cannot 
be simple "relationship between things" (Sachverhiiltnis)-as 
Vierkandt named it-which exists where military force is 
used_ No matter how intense mutual antagonism and hatred 
is, what exists there is always the relationship between men, 
not that between men and things. In the social relation, 
both sides are necessarily capable of understanding each 
other's sentiment, and each cannot help but treat the other 
as man. This is true even of what is called exogenous 
military force (die exogene Gewalt)."' Suppose that one 
group of people resorts to military force against another for 
5) Oppenheimer. Machtverlriltnis. Handworterbuch der SoziologIe, p. 338. 
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conquest, there wilI stilI exist between them an understanding 
of some sort, and social contact though antagonism wilI be 
possible. It is, even in such circumstances, impossible to 
say that social relations are entirely absent. Further, suppose 
that one group uses military force against another. This 
military force is not the force of a synthetic community 
embracing these two groups, nor has it any foundation in 
such a community. It is, in a sense, exogenous armed force 
whereby the group may be conquered. Seeing, however, that 
the relations of these groups are, after all, relations between 
men, the military force in question cannot be regarded as 
a force existing outside social relations. From this point of 
view, the modifications or amendments which Oppenheimer 
attempts to make to Weber's concept of power can not be 
admitted. The same thing may be said of the restrictions 
which Simmel sets on mutuality in regard to mental inter· 
action and Vierkandt in regard to social relationship.') 
Let me proceed to consider various forms or kinds of 
social power. 
II 
In considering the various forms which social power 
takes, it is necessary, to begin with, to make clear the dis· 
tinction between social power and social pressure or social 
coercion. The latter may simply be termed social force. 
For society (society in its totality is meant here, and perhaps 
the term community, used by McIver, can be substituted for 
it) to be maintained and kept in existence, pressure of some 
kind or other must be ,exerted on its members, and the 
activity of individuals must needs be regulated so that it 
may be directed towards a certain goal fixed by society itself. 
7) Vier kandt, GeseUschaftslehre, 2. ed. 1928, p. 169, 280. 
Simmel tried to exclude some case of coercion from the sphere of the 
. social (seeIiscbe Wechse1wirkung), because of the fact that the oppressed can 
not read on the oppressor in any way. The same Hne of thinking can be 
traced in the thought of Vierkandt who, going further. has given systematic 
treatment. on the so-calIed "Sachverhaltnis." Simmel. Soziologie, 1908. p. 135 . 
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This pressure, of course, takes a variety of forms and is 
achieved by various means, legal, moral, conventional, or 
religious. This pressure is sometimes entirely anonymous 
and impersonal. Anonymity here means that pressure is not 
ordered, forced or supported by any particular person or 
persons, but is exerted merely as a public or popular require· 
ment. Most manners and customs fall into this category. 
Sometimes the content of social pressure or coercion requires 
amenability to the will of a certain specified individual or 
group for the sake of the personality of the latter, and some· 
times it requires not obedience to the will of any person 
but observance of the objective regulation fixed beforehand. 
When the latter is the case, we say that pressure is imposed 
impersonally. Social pressure is sometimes exerted denomina· 
tively, that is, by or in the name of the ruler or in that of 
the State, and personally, that is,/or some persons explicitly." 
In any case, all kinds of restraints or norms destined to 
maintain society constitute social pressure. Some forms of 
this pressure, irrespective of the anonymity or otherwise of 
its supporters, are personal, when, viewed with regard to 
the content, they are destined to secure subordination. The 
reverse side of submission or obedience to this personal 
social pressure forms the social power of the person in 
question. Of course, if some part of social pressure, though 
existent as fact, is not yet given the form of norm, for 
example as content of customs, morals or laws, social power 
which is dependent on it, can hardly be said to be supported 
by social norms. It must then be regarded as merely 
supported by social pressure de facto. 
Of all forms of social pressure, the only one which 
constitutes social power is that which is attributable to a 
certain specified person, that is, which implies subordination 
to the person specified. If the former or the social pressure 
itself can be called "social force" (in the sense of power 
pertaining to society), the latter or the social power may 
8) Wieser. Recht und Macht. 1910. p. 8. 
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well be called personal power in the sense that it belongs 
to that person. Social power in this sense may be classified 
in a variety of ways from various points of view. Firstly, 
it may be divided into internal and external power. In this 
regard, Wieser's interpretation deserves notice. He says that 
arms and fortifications are means of power (Machtmittei), 
not power itself. Those who make use of these means 
possess external power. External power means control over 
sentiment by the instrumentality of external means of 
power." On the other hand, internal power means direct 
control over the sentiment of people in society, without the 
help of external means of power. The power of laws, 
morals, faith, knowledge, currents of thought, movements 
and conventions and customs, in which the potency of 
moving human sentiment is recognised falls under this 
category.'" Of these two, it often appears that external 
power alone represents power, because its action is particu· 
lariy visible. As a matter of fact, however, it is internal 
power, which is really fundamental. It is internal power 
which determines to whom a definite external means of 
power, should belong and for whose benefit it should be 
employed, and accordingly to whom the external power 
expressed by such external means belongs. Take, for in-
stance, the case of the power of the conquerors in a con· 
quered State, he goes on. It is a conglomeration of internal 
powers (die innere Machtaggregat), united by the national 
sentiment (Volksgefiihl) of the conquerors, which can oppress 
the conquered people. It is internal powers, naIve though 
they are, which make up their solid association. The increase 
of the powers of conquerors means that their internal power 
gets infiltrated into the conglomeration of external powers 
of the conquered to serve the purpose of the conquerors.'" 
In line with my criticism of Wieser's interpretation as so 
far given, I may say that when Wieser describes external 
9) Wieser, Gesetz der Macht, p. 5; ditto, Recht und Macht, p. 10. 
10) Wieser. Gesetz der Macht. p. 4-5. 
11) op. cit., p. 6-7. 
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power as personal and internal power as impersonal, he is 
contrasting two things which cannot be contrasted. For 
even external power must be impersonal when it cannot be 
attributed to, or cannot belong to a person, while internal 
power includes something personal, seeing that the spontane' 
ous obedience of people constitutes very often the superior 
positions of some persons. What Wieser describes as internal 
power is, after all, nothing but a kind of social pressure, to 
which reference has already been made. It means coercion 
(untrainte) which Durkheim mentions as a characteristic or 
social phenomena.'" Accordingly Wieser's external power 
is to he reconstrued as external social pressure, which is 
nothing but social pressure through the instrumentality of 
external means. 
Now, let the study be confined to social power, that is, 
power attributed to a certain specified person or a group of 
persons. This power can also be divided into internal and 
external power, while power, in this case, means the ability 
to determine the will of other subjects as explained above. 
The obedience, which is nothing else than this capability 
viewed from the standpoint of the other party, may be 
spontaneous. In other words, power may be founded on 
something internal. To give another expression to the same 
fact, obedienc~ may be based on morality or customs or it 
may proceed spontaneously from a sense of respect. On the 
other hand, it may also be due to external coercion. In 
this case, power may be said to have an external basis. 
No matter how it is founded, power operates to determine 
the will of the party on whom it is brought to bear. If 
necessary in the fulfilment of this function, power can take 
various forms of outward expression. 
One form of coercion it takes is military force. This 
force finds expression in the form of exacting obedience 
from those who refuse to obey, by dint of the external 
means of those who vow allegiance. Another form is spiritual 
12) Durkheim. Regles des la methode sociologique, sixieme ed. 1912, p. 8. 
---------- -_. __ .. _-_._-_ ... _---_ .. 
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restraint. This restraint operates either as suasion or as 
pressure, and consequently must be interpreted as having 
two sides, positive and negative. It forcibly shapes the will 
of others in a certain fixed direction by giving spiritual 
pleasure or pain such as honour, censure of disgrace. Fur· 
ther, there is material or economic restraints or sanctions. 
which has also two sides, positive and negative, that is to 
give material interest or to deprive of it. Thus viewed, 
it will be seen that military force does not in itself signify 
the fact of being obeyed, which means social power itself. 
It is merely one form of the action of this power. It is 
accordingly only one partial power or one form of partial 
expression of power. This proposition also applies to the 
power of wealth, which is economic by nature. It may be 
mentioned, however, that these things do not represent the 
form of action peculiar to the personal power or social power 
under discussion. Social pressure in general takes such 
forms of operation also. Especially spiritual restraint makes 
a particularly powerful form of operation in customs and 
morality. 
Be the matter what. it may, this form of the expression 
of social power brings into being a new power externally 
grounded. By a process which I have no time to describe 
in detail here, external power settles and crystallises into 
internal power. Consider the commonplace experience that 
a fact which has a definite cause becomes not seldom a 
custom after continued repetition. In its turn internal power 
furnishes a basis for the new external power, which, again 
in turn, transforms itself into internal power. In this way, 
power has a tendency to grow of itself. This is what I 
once called the law of the acceleration of power. 
Social power is also divided into endogenic and exogenic. 
Whether it is the former or the latter depends on whether 
the power which is exerted on a certain group or its mem-
bers has its foundation in this partial society, that is, 
whether the power is based on the obedience of the com-
ponent members of this group or not. For instance. if a 
--- ----~ 
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State is composed of a number of different groups (for 
example, nations) and its authority is upheld chiefly by the 
unity of one of these component groups, this State power 
must, on the whole, be regarded by the other component 
group as exogenic power. On the contrary, where the 
members of one religious body are subject to the power of 
their religious body to the social power of a person who 
represents it, they are controlled by endogenic power. Power 
of internal origin (or endogenic power) and internal power 
are not necessarily correlated ideas, since power of internal 
origin in a partial society is not always internal power; the 
former may spring up as external power based on mutua! 
armed compulsion between its componen t members. Further-
more, it may sometimes exert pressure from without, as a 
united power on an outside partial society. In this case, this 
power is an exogenic one for the outside society. Whether 
any particular social power is exogenic or endogenic depends 
on the degree or state of the association existing between the 
party which exerts power and the other party over which it 
is exerted. Even where A exerts its power over B, if A 
and B are so closely united that they may be regarded as 
forming one complete whole between them, A's power, if 
rightly thought to be supported by B, is not exogenic power 
for B. Otherwise, it is power of external origin. 
III 
Next, let me divide social power according to the form 
of its distribution. Society in its totality contains a number 
of partial societies,") and each partial society plays its part 
in the distribution of social power. Here, however, attention 
will primarily be directed to the distribution of power by 
the State, which is the most important of all. And then, the 
effects of the distribution of power by other partial socie· 
tie!\ will be considered. In this way, it is hoped the distri-
bution of social power in actual life may be better explained. 
13) McIver. Community, 1920, p. 138 et seq . 
......... - ... -- -----
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Since the functions of a State consist primarily in the 
defence of society, it must be provided with effectual means 
of defence against both internal and external opponents. 
This necessity leads it to demand the utmost obedience from 
its members, the obedience secured being formed into definite 
organisation. This organised obedience, as organised power, 
forms the State·power. The power thus concentrated in the 
possession of the State is distributed in a variety of ways, 
so that the power distributed goes to constitute the social 
power of each subject. To distribute power means to aid 
and protect each subject in the execution of its own will. 
Firstly, it is distributed according to functions. The State 
has many organs so that it may fulfil its functions. Those 
who operate as these organs, that is, the component parts 
of these organisations are given powers according to the 
functions which they are called upon to perform. These 
powers are regarded as belonging, to a certain extent, to the 
subject who discharges the appointed duties. To what extent 
it is so regarded depends, of course, on the degree of com· 
plexity in social circumstances. Where social life is extremely 
intellectualised and everything is subjected to a rational 
analysis, people will consider these two things as separate 
entities, in the consciousness that the subiect concerned 
is given power by virtue of the official function which he 
is called upon to perform as an organ of society and that 
this power does not belong to him personally. Thus, in 
such a society functional power will not impress people as 
a thing belonging to an individual. This is especially so, if 
the term of office is limited and the occupant of the office 
is chosen by election. The extent to which the social life 
is rationalized being abstracted, the more inseparable the 
connection between the function and functioning members, 
the more liable is functional power to be regarded as the 
personal power of the individual who exercises it."" Setting 
apart this phase of the problem, the strength of functional 
14) SimmeJ, Soziologie, 1908. p. 181, 569. 
- '- - --- ----- '-~- ---~~ 
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power depends on the extent to which public interests are 
affected by the manner of its exercise. It is, therefore, hardly 
necessary to say that the personal power derived from the 
functionally distributed power or pressure is of varying 
strength according to the position of function in the hierarchic 
system of organization exercising the State power. 
A State also distributes power extra·functionally. In 
other words, it confers a certain position or status on some 
members according to their qualification and without regard 
to their function, though the distribution of function is in· 
fluenced by the positions of members. To give a position 
to a person means to give a certain social power irrespective 
of his function and merit as if it were his own possession. 
He enjoys, so to speak, the protection of the State in a 
larger measure than other people do. That is to say, a 
privilege in a wide sense is bestowed on him. The privileges 
thus given may be of varying kinds. (1) A certain kind of 
authority which can be exercised over an extensive area or 
over an extensive sphere of social life is sometimes bestowed 
on persons, as witness the position of feudal lords, the con· 
quering class in a conquest state, or in some cases, the 
religious aristocracy. (2) Special marks of honour (which 
serve to indicate the standards of obedience on the part of 
the members of society) or special rights are sometimes 
conferred on persons. The position of the present·day peers 
who are denuded of authority owes its existence to this cause. 
(3) In ,ome cases, economic wealth may be conferred. 
I have, now, reached a stage in my discourse at which 
I must consider the distinction between the original social 
power and the derived social powers. 
Social power as the capacity to compel obedience is 
distributed in various forms, a circumstance which brings 
into being what may be called derived social powers. In 
some cases, the power conferred may be all·embracing in 
its sphere of operation, as, for example, the power which 
feudal lords possessed. In other cases, it may be functional 
power or the power possessed by the functioning agent, the 
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scope of the operation of which is confined to certain spheres 
of life. In some other cases, power may be certain rights 
which are possessed as positions and which are fixed in the 
degree and scope of their operation. In these latter cases, 
power is partial, since it means a chance or possibility which 
can compel obedience from others within specified limits, in 
regard to certain matters, and to a certain limited extent. 
In short, the derived powers which I have explained above 
are divided into those mentioned below. While, on the one 
hand, (A) comprehensive power as an authority is derived 
and maintained by the conferring of some parts of State· 
power, (B) partial powers as functional powers, which are 
concerned with certain specified functions, are also, on the 
other hand, conferred by the State on some individuals. (e) 
In addition to these, there are other partial powers in regard 
to special positions. (a) When honour or a special right is 
conferred, the position which enjoys it partakes of the nature 
of one derived partial power. (j3) The wealth which is be· 
stowed and protected by it (as, for instance, the stipends of 
feudal lords or the present·day salaries, though not any and 
every sort of wealth) forms a sort of partial power too, since, 
being guaranteed by State·power, it ensures obedience of some 
kind on the part of other constituent members of society. 
{Original power Derived power {All-embracing IXlwer . 
Partial power {Functional power 
Positional power fPrivileges(honouf) 
1 Economic power 
(such as is distri-
buted by central 
authority). 
These are sociai powers ramifying from State·power. 
The State not only distributes derived powers by its authority 
but makes the distribution of some kinds of power possible 
or helps in their distribution, though indirectly. I mean 
that as the private property system is maintained by the 
State, it makes it possible or inevitable for wealth to .be 
distributed under the working of this system, though it does 
not undertake the distribution of wealth directly. In what 
---~---------
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sense. then. does wealth constitute a kind of social power? 
On the one hand. wealth commands obedience. in a negative 
way. so that since it is placed in the hands of a limited 
number of people. it is protected from encroachment on the 
part of other members of society. while, on the other hand, 
it commands obedience in a positive way so that wealth 
makes all people who are in pursuit of wealth bow to the 
will of those who are in possession of it. Thus, there exists 
a sort of conditional obedience. In this sense, the possession 
of wealth forms a kind of partial social power, which either 
concentrates or dissipates in changing hands in the process 
of the free transactions of individuals under conditions 
recognised by the State. As the power of the wealth ac· 
quired in this way is brought into being independently of 
the will of the State. Though it presupposes the State· power 
as its prerequisite, it forms a kind of "wild·grown" power'''. 
if the power which is directly distributed by the will of an 
organisation called the State can be termed "public·grown" 
power. 
Society in its totality contains a number of partial socie-
ties, and it is hardly necessary to say that the State occupies 
the central position among them. In the present state of 
civilised countries at least, the State is the decisive factor in 
the distribution of social power. At the same time, the fact 
must not be ignored that power is also distributed by partial 
societies other than the State. It is true that the Church, 
which competed with the State for the ruling position in the 
medieval age, has lost a considerable part of its influence to-
day, but it, together with trade unions and other organizations, 
still wields no negligible sway over the distribution of power. 
How is social power distributed by these partial societies? 
Partial societies, be they religious bodies. trade unions, 
co-operative societies or other associations, are internally 
organized, and perform their functions through the activity 
of their organs. These associations vary in the degree of 
15) .. die wildgewachsene Macht" in the sense used by Wieser. 
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power they possess according to the sphere of life with 
which they are concerned, and according to the attitude 
adopted by the State towards them, but the fact always re-
mains that they possess power in a greater or lesser degree. 
Towards the association which they make up, its component 
units stand in a relationship of subordination. The more an 
association partakes of the nature of community (Gemein-
schaft),'6) the stronger is also the power of this group; 
while the weaker the control of the State, the stronger the 
obedience and power in like manner. In practically the 
same manner as in the case of the State, the functional and 
positional distribution of power is carried out by the authority 
which has its foundation in one association. 
One who is responsible for the performance of any 
function in a partial society possesses power because of his 
function. The strength of his power varies according to the 
degree of authority of the association, which will be deter-
mined by the nature of the sphere of life which it controls. 
For instance, in the case of the Church of old days, 
sacerdotal power, which was in rivalry with secular power, 
not only occupied· a position powerful enough so over-rule 
the State but even wielded seculur power to a certain ex-
tent_ The power distributed functionally by the Church 
must, then, have been as strong as that distributed by the 
State. It is not altogether impossible for a situation ana-
logous to this to arise in the event of the power of trade 
unions growing in conseqnence of their development. As the 
State has become modernised, however, the functions of the 
State have gradually increased, while the sphere over which 
the power of a partial society holds sway has steadily dimini-
shed. As already mentioned, a partial society not only dis-
tributes power functionally but undertakes the distribution 
of certain positions_ How far it is capable of this, how-
ever, depends on the extent to which hierarchical or class 
principles are adopted in the organization of the association 
16) in the sense used. by Ferdinand TODDies in his famous work. Ge-
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concerned. An association which is organized on extreme-
ly democratic principles will not recognise any distri-
bution of power other than functional, viz., the positional 
distribution of power. In the case of a church which has 
an organization similar to that of the State, various extra-
functional positions will be recognised within it, and the 
power of the association itself will be brought to bear in 
compelling obedience. At any rate, associations other than 
the State perform both the functional and positional distribu-
tion of power among their component units, and the various 
powers thus distributed, which submit to and centre in their 
respective subjects, operate to determine the positions or 
powers of each person or group of persons in the society 
in its totality. There is one thing which must be mentioned 
in regard to the positional distribution of power by partial 
societies. Most partial societies will do nothing in the way 
of the positional distribution of power, in so far as the posi-
tional power is regarded as a sort of privilege given to some 
members of the society concerned. It is, however, not only 
possible but rather usual for a partial society to give help 
and protection to all its members. The closer the associa-
tion, and especially the more it aims at the promotion of the 
class position of its component members, the more conspicu· 
ous is the power which these members derive from its pro· 
tection, that is, the power which they exert on the outside 
world. This is a phenomenon which is widely observable 
when the positional power given by a partial society is taken 
to cover this extensive field. 
It must, however, be remembered that there is, besides 
the above, social power which, lacking any fixed form, is 
fluid. This is a power which has nothing to do with any 
particular association and is consequently not supported by 
any organization. It has its foundation in traditions, customs 
or morals, or it grows out of new currents of thought. For 
instance, traditions or customs often condition the attitude 
to be adopted by the public towards men of certain pedigrees 
or lineage; they guarantee these people obedience of a cer· 
.. __ . __ .. _-----------_ .. _---< 
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tain degree on the part of the members of society. The 
position of feudal lords and even that of the present·day 
capitalists may be regarded as founded more or less on such 
a basis. Again, when there is the growth of social conscious-
ness as evidenced by new currents of thought and new 
movements, there springs up on the one hand obedience to 
those who lead such social movements, and, moreover, on 
the other hand, value is upset, according to the nature of 
the new social consciousness, so that there come into being 
things which newly claim public regard, while some things 
which have so far commanded general respect fall into dis· 
credit. We have personally seen such things occur during 
the past twenty years in the attitude of the public towards 
landowners, capitalists and soldiers. 
Let me add something to what I have already stated 
regarding the power of wealth. I have already referred to 
the wealth which is distributed by the State directly. Not 
only does the State itself distribute wealth consciously but 
it distributes it indirectly, as it were, by the act of protect· 
ing the ownership of each individual. By the exercise of its 
authority, the State protects the wealth possessed by the 
people as the result of the process of free transactions be-
tween individuals. Thus, the possession of wealth embodies 
a kind of negative power in that any attempt to encroach 
on it is suppressed by the State. Nor is this all. Wealth 
represents a sort of negative power in transactions between 
individuals. That is to say, the possessor of wealth can 
secure the obedience of others to a certain extent by dis· 
pensing his wealth. In this sense, wealth constitutes a means 
of securing external power and consequently internal power 
too in many case. How far wealth can act as an instru· 
mentality for the securing of obedience, however, depends on 
the type of social association, on the one hand, and on the 
state of the class relation on the other. In the present·day 
utilitarian (gesellschaftiich) society, there exists the Simple 
wage relation (Lohnverhiiltnis), in which labour only, and no 
more than that, is offered in return for the money paid as 
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wages. This, of course, does not mean that internal power 
and intimate (gemeinschaftlich) social relations are entirely 
eliminated from tne enterprise concerned and that manage· 
ment (Betrieb) is put on a purely contractual and equal 
footing. Where the social association is generally on the 
social lines of community (Gemeinschaft), a different state 
of things prevails. The offer of labour in return for the 
money and commodities given or the compensation offered 
by personal service in return for economic gifts of some 
form or other tends to give birth to a close and intimate 
social association, in which a relationship of subordination, 
that is, of master and servant, easily springs up. This is 
especially so, when the sway of the State authority declines 
and new relations of powerful control in some form or other 
develop in consequence (as is seen in the birth of feudalism). 
Thus, although wealth is in itself a power which is indirect 
and conditional, it can easily govern relations of direct power 
or relations of personal obedience, according to the circums· 
tances of the society in which it moves. We see instances 
of wealth engendering obedience or position, where those 
who own cannot pay their debts are reduced to slavery or 
where those who own land, with tenant.farmers on it who 
are inseparably bound up with the land. become lords of 
the manor. Contrary cases are seen where people possessed 
of enormous wealth are looked down upon as being of low 
character or low in the social scale (as witness a state 
actually existing in some parts of China or one phase of life 
existing in the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan). 
IV 
In what relation, then, does the power under discussion 
stand to violence or military force (physical, coercive force)? 
Hitherto, the authority of the State or society has, almost 
always, been regarded by scholars as synonymous with mili· 
tary force. Is this interpretation acceptable? In my analysis 
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such power into three kinds. Power implies obedience on 
the part of those on whom it is exercised. There are two 
ways in which the subject secures obedience: he either 
captures it or he finds it. In the latter case, obedience is 
voluntarily offered to the subject who does not necessarily 
solicit it. In the former case, the subject is in a position to 
compel obedience by some means or other. In other words, 
the one is external power and the other internal ·power. 
Military or economic power belong to the former, while 
dignity (which means the state of being obeyed on account 
of superiority of personality, as, for example, authority, 
prestige or charisma (Xduapa) in the sense in which the term 
is used by Max Weber) belongs to the latter. So long as 
power is classified in this way, it is impossible to find place 
for authority in this classification, unless it is regarded in 
the same light as military force. 
But can the State·power sometimes expressed as State· 
authority (and also the power belonging to any organized 
society itself) be identified with military force? Of course, 
authority can make use of military force, if necessary for 
coercive purposes. Is it, however, possible to say, conversely, 
that military force means State-power? Can the military 
force of the conqueror be rightly called State·authority from 
the point of view of the conquered? Can the violence of 
revolutionaries be properly termed State·authority? In an 
ideal government, no military force whatever would be 
necessary, and yet there would naturally operate ti)e forces 
necessary for perfect rule. There is no question but that 
these forces constitute State·authority. It seems that State-
power is that which, though it is not military force in itself, 
can put military force into operation, if the occasion de· 
mands it. Military force is not State'power, nor is State· 
power per se military force. State·power is often expressed 
in terms of military force (as, for instance, division of 
authority is denoted by the term Gewaitenteilung). This is 
a mistake, however. How, then, ought the relationship sub· 
sisting between these two things to be interpreted? 
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State-power, or to speak generally, societY'power, may 
be said to consist in organized obedience of members. When 
a society comes to have organization, obedience, either to 
the society itself or to the central figure of the society, be-
comes organized_ The strength of this obedience or the 
sphere of life involves varies, as already pointed out, accord-
ing to circumstances. This authority can exact obedience 
from those who are under the obligation to obey, that is, 
those whom the society calls upon to obey_ That this com-
pulsion takes three different forms I have had occasion to 
mention already_ One is military force_ Here, the physical 
power of those who obey is utilised_ This is a form of 
direct compulsion. The other two embody indirect compul-
sion. In those cases, obedience is exacted by either giving 
to or taking from individuals what they hold dear. Indirect 
compulsion falls into two different categories according as 
the things which these individuals hold dear are spiritual, 
such as privileges or honour, or material. Since compulsion 
always means a sort of external power, each of these three 
forms in which it operates may be taken to be a partial 
power. To illustrate this by an analogy provided by physics, 
when energy generates heat and light as the result of its 
partial action, either heat or light is regarded as partial energy. 
Thus viewed, it will be seen that it is a mistake to 
regard military force as identical with State power. Military 
force is merely one mode of expession or one of the forms 
which State power takes when it operates (and this is also 
the form of the operation of social pressure in general, to 
which reference has already been made). It is always 
included in State power in a latent or potential state. In 
most cases, however, it does not adopt such a mode of ex-
pression_ It fulfils the function of social control while opera-
ting as internal power, As another form in which State 
power operates, I referred above to economic power or wealth, 
but this does not apply to all economic power. As stated 
elsewhere, if private ownership is recognised by the State, 
each individual can dispose of his wealth according to his 
---_._--
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own free will, and, through its disposal, he can demand 
obedience of some kind from those who profit by such dis· 
posal. It is only in the wealth which is distributed directly 
by the State that the operation of the State-power under 
discussion can be seen. 
I have hitherto analysed the nature of social power. 
Now I will proceed to describe the way in which this power 
is distributed to the members of society in its totality. 
v 
Social power is distributed in two ways. In one case, 
it emanates from society, and in the other case, it comes 
from individuals. In the latter case, an individual, in his 
personal capacity, is obeyed directly by the other component 
members of society. That is to say, he possesses social 
power originally.H) Not that society confers on one of its 
component members the power which it has commandeered 
for the purpose of ensuring its continued existence, but 
rather it is that power arises out of the individual capacity 
of the component members of society in their mutual rela· 
tionship and is put in his hands. Of course, the power 
formed personally loses its original character when it 
comes to form the content of social institutions or social 
consciousness (as, for example, customs or morals). It then 
acquires the character of power emanating from, and con· 
ferred by, society. 
Power emanating from society may be divided into two 
kinds. One is denominative (not anonymous); it is distri· 
buted in the name of a certain definite personality (as, for 
example, the State, the monarch, the church or the city). 
The other is anonymous; it is distributed, not in the name 
of any definite personality, but in the process of social inter· 
action. The former type of power is subdivided into two-
one being the power which is given to persons who perform 
17) d. Simmei, Soziologie, p. 13G. 
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certain functions because of those functions, and the other 
that which is given as the concomitant of a certain special 
position, regardless of functions. The one is distributed func· 
tionally, while the other is distributed extra·functionally. By 
the power which is given in the process of social interaction, 
I mean support by social consciousness such as customs, 
morals or public opinion, that is, protection by the inter· 
action of individuals, not by any organization or organized 
groups such as corporations, churches, etc. 
Social pressure which society in its totality requires for 
maintaining its own existence becomes social power when 
individuals participate in it, as I have already explained. In 
order to form a comprehensive idea of the distribution of 
social power, the nature of power emanating from individuals 
must be studied. This is the power which is given to a 
certain individual in his personal capacity by those around 
him, personally and differentially, so to speak, and not one 
which society confers on him. Here, I shall analyse the 
latter and then consider the nature of relations of power. 
The power which is given to individuals by society, that 
is, the power which society distributes among its members, 
stands out conspicuously. But this is not the only social 
power; there is social power which emanates from, and is 
formed in, individuals as has been said above. But this kind 
of social power originating from individuals may of course, 
after taking its place in social consciousnese, be transformed 
into power distributed by society. This is, however, irrelevant. 
Each individual has his own ability. I do not mean his 
personal talent only, but also that ability which is due to 
the power distributed socially. Because this ability is res· 
pected (or held in contempt, in negative cases) in personal 
relationships, there comes about a relationship of super- and 
subordination. In a sense, a tendency to subordination 
naturally exists among the people, and it flows to the posses' 
sor of might, so that people hold in high regard a powerful 
man (a person who has a large potential capacity to enforce 
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a certain dignity.'I) The extent to which dignity characterizes 
personal talent which IS unaccompanied by social power 
varies according to the state of social organization. If the 
disparity between social classes is very great, dignity will 
attend social power almost exculusively, so that it may at· 
tend personal talent only slightly. In any case, individuals 
receive the regard due to their respective ability, and they 
will be assigned their respective positions in the hierarchy 
of values established on this basis. The viewpoint shared 
by the general public will eventually be incorporated in 
customs and morals. Where the public regard is not so 
strong as to be taken into such social norms, the dignity 
remains only fluid so to speak. 
Personal dignity possessed by some person is of special 
distinction. Such dignity is what is commonly called authority 
or prestige according to its peculiar nuance. Among all kinds 
of dignity recognised in individuals on account of their ability, 
it seems proper to regard such dignity as one with a peculiar 
nuance, rather than as an isolated phenomenon. 
Now, let me explain two groups of facts with special 
reference to this dignity. One refers to the positions of the 
people belonging to different categories of society (occupa· 
tions, for instance), and the other concerns prestige, authority, 
etc. I shall first explain the former. We hear that in India 
hundreds of partial groups exist (or existed, at least) in the 
shape of difierent castes, with their respective social positions, 
high and low. This fact shows that in all societies there is 
a tendency for relations of social strata to appear, to a 
larger or lesser degree, if not in such a fixed shape as castes. 
The organization of castes in India seems to embody this 
tendency settled into fixed shape. A similar tendency appears 
to rule more or less even between labourers of all kinds who 
would appear, at first sight, to stand on exactly the same 
footing with one another. All occupations in all sections of 
society need talent, discipline and education peculiar to 
18) lowe this tenn to James Mill: it was also used in Bougl~:"s .. Essai 
sur Ie regiule de5 ~aste9" in the expression 41 digni~ del proil!99ion9." 
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themselves. They have different morals and customs. They 
are also accorded different traditional treatment and have 
different niveaux of property. People are prone to fix the 
degree of regard for each category or group, in due consi-
deration of these facts, and their common appraisal becomes 
interwoven into customs or usage. When any change occurs 
in the power of any of these groups, this public estimation 
is subject to amendment, personally at first and then sociallY. 
For instance, changes in the thoughts of the times or in 
the requirements of society invest the activity of this or 
that occupation with special importance_ In short each group 
carries its scale of public regard, as "a phenomenon of dig-
nity," according to its ability, and these scales ultimately 
become interwoven into social consciousness. Such being the 
case, even in presen-day society, in which there exists no 
system of fixed personal status and all people are accorded 
equal rights, members belonging to different categories or 
groups have their respective positions of power. These 
positions are not, of course, definitely fixed, and are subject 
to constant changes as social conditions alter, but at the 
same time the fact cannot be denied that they are tradi-
tional to a certain extent_ 
Some scholars (such as Gustav Schmoller) take the view 
that the scales in social estimation agree with social utilities 
of professions in the sense of satisfying social needs or 
demands, and that the former are determined by the latter, 
but this view is mistaken_ It is true that according to the 
intensity of social ultilities of services done, the respective 
degree of some sociel power is conferred on the members of 
each group (as witness the different incomes of various pro-
fessional groups), nor can it be denied that the social power 
thus conferred affects the scales of respect, but in principle 
it is the strength of social power, not social utilities, which 
fixes the degree of respect accorded to each group_ Even if 
it is granted that regard represents a sort of value pheno-
menon, its degree is not fixed by ultilities, as I have had 
frequent occasion to point out in the past_ 
--------
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VI 
Some dignity, as power emanating from individuals, is' 
linked to superior individuality or eminent power. Such 
dignity is not possessed by any members of a certain group 
in common; it belongs to superior persons among them only. 
Prestige is one thing, and authority is another. Authority 
is defined as the confidence which others put in the belief 
that something objective lies in him. If the work done by 
a certain person in a cultural field is of a specially high 
order, when judged by an objective standard, he is trusted, 
apart from this or that work done. When people see that 
the will of a man in some powerful position always sets the 
rule by which all measures in society are framed, they be· 
come persuaded that he has something objective in him. In 
such cases, they recognise authority in him. Authority waits, 
in the first instance, on a high appraisal of value. For it, 
of course, spontaneous regard, and accordingly obedience, is 
shown. As authority waits on judgment of value, it is condi· 
tional to that extent, and it sometimes happens that a man 
with authority is criticised, if the surrounding conditions 
necessitate criticism. On the contrary, prestige is uncondi-
tionaL The impression that a certain subject has incalculable 
ability and that his ability springs from sources which can-
not be easily understood or grasped causes people to adopt 
towards him an attitude of unconditional subordination. 
This ability is, as already mentioned. social power possessed 
by an individual, on the one hand, and his personal cultural 
ability, on the other. Towards a man who has incompara-
bly great authority or wealth, people feel a sort of awe. He 
strikes them even as something inviolable or sacred. The 
prestige of such a man issues from the incalculable amount 
of ability which is derived from the social power given to 
him. This phenomenon is observable not only in regard to 
the social power of a certain subject, as already explained, 
but in respect of the individual ability of some persons whose 
religious, martial, or other cultural or secular faculty is 
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supreme or stands so high that it is unattainable by common 
people. Because of their immeasurable ability, they become 
objects of subordination. Such subordination cannot be 
regarded as merely personal by nature. There is a tendency 
for the same respectful attitude adopted by the majority of 
the component members of society to stimulate even greater 
general regard until it develops into the content of social 
consciousness so that supreme social power is put in the 
hands of the possessor of prestige. 
This tendency yields three results. (1) The upholders 
of the power distributed socially very often elevate its 
strength by this prestige. The action of this prestige makes 
the law of the acceleration of power operate more strongly. 
(2) Social power is sometimes distributed in accordance with 
rational principles and at other times it is distributed by the 
policy of class egoism. In so far as the mode of distribution 
is not affected by the principle of class egoism, men of ability 
are put in positions with important functions, so that, those 
in whom a certain prestige is socially recognised because of 
their ability can easily attain a leading position. In this way. 
power which attends on position and prestige which is 
possessed by an individual reinforce each other. (3) If this 
prestige gains in strength until it forms the content of social 
consciousness. though within a certain group. there springs 
up a social power which is independent of the power of the 
group, and which is sustained by the will of the whole com· 
munity. This social power becomes especially strong when 
the prestige is associated with a certain current of thought 
or a certain movement in the background. Even though 
this social power is created by a certain current of thought 
and movemen t so that it may play the leading role in them. 
the fact remains that it acquires special strength when it is 
combined with personal prestige. 
Prestige means unconditional obedience which owes itself 
to the unfathomable ability possessed by a certain subject 
-no matter whether it represents social power or personal 
talent. This subordination may be sometimes related to a 
.... _--_ .. --. -.~-
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certain sphere of culture or it may concern personal rela· 
tionship only, and is consequently not restricted to some 
sphere of life. In any case, the personality itself forms the 
object of obedience. For example, a person who is accorded 
prestige in the field of magic, religion and art, is respected 
and obeyed unconditionally without examining the objective 
value of his achievements, directions and assertions. More· 
over, apart from these cultural considerations, his personality 
itself forms the object of obedience to a certain extent. The 
extent of this obedience depends on how far the social 
organization is fixed and how far all positions are hereditary. 
Sometimes a person is endowed with prestige, in personal 
relations, on account of his strength of will or power of 
personality, apart from the consideration of any cultural 
content. 
As mentioned above, prestige embodies the reverse side 
of subordination to one with inestimable power. It is, there· 
fore, entirely ascribable to personality; it is implicit belief 
in, and tacit devotion to, something which is beyond all 
understanding. Although prestige can be of varying degrees, 
it has nothing whatever to do with the rational attitude 
which dictates obedience to whatever is found of high value 
on simple appraisal. 
In this respect, a distinction is often made between 
authority and prestige. Subordination to authority is regard· 
ed as subordination to something objective. Simmel gives 
two instances of authority. One is where authority is due 
to the status which super·personal influences such as the 
State and the Church bestow on an individual personality. 
The other is where it is due to the circumstance in which, 
confidence in an individual becoming general, privileges and 
axiomatic confidence are given to him. He lays stress on 
the fact that in any case there is discernible agreement be· 
tween objectivity and personality. On the other hand, in 
prestige there is a lack of agreement between personality 
and objective norms and power. There is only unconditional 
obedience to the centre of personality. Whereas authority, 
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which is dispassionate by nature, leaves room for criticism, 
prestige simply attracts and absorbs us.'" 
The authority of an individual is born of the firm public 
belief that he has something objective in him. With regard 
to authority of cultural content, it means fulI public confidence 
in a man because his achievements in the past have been 
shown to be of high value, when judged by certain standards. 
He is so trusted that his individual works are not subjected 
to any close scrutiny. Regarding the aspects of control, it 
may be said that because he occupies a certain powerful 
position, the public believe that final decision on alI social 
rulings lie with him. Authority springs up where personality 
is believed to combine with something objective, while the 
prominent feature of prestige is unconditional subordination 
based on the belief that his ability is inestimable, as was 
stated above. Theodor Geiger is presumably right when he 
says that prestige, in the sense in which Leopold interprets it, 
is identical with what Max Weberc alls charisma.'" 
From this point of view, authority may be said to 
signify rational, (to be exact, indirectly rational) subordina· 
tion; that is, subordination based on rational judgement, 
which is made in this case in postulating the unification of 
personality and objectivity. But it is not directly rational 
because it is not examined in the light of one's own stand· 
ards. Prestige is essentially irrational as well as personal; 
it is concerned with the whole personality. Vierkandt divides 
relations of powor into two, leading and ruling. He describes 
the former as personal and the latter as institutional, and 
further asserts that whereas the former is based on purely 
internal power, the latter permits of the interposition of 
external power. So far, he is quite understandable.'" But 
when he says that subordination in the former is founded 
on authority and in the latter on prestige, asserting that 
19) Simme!, Soziologie, p. 139-137. 
20) Theodor Geiger. Fiihrung. Handworterbuch dec Soziologie, p. 137; 
Max Weber. Wirtsc:haft und Gesellschaft, p. 124. 
21} Vierkandt, op. cit., p. 280-290. 
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while the power of authority is rational, that of prestige is 
irrational and magical, it is difficult to follow his line of 
argument. He leaves unelucidated the point as to why insti· 
tutional norm and personal prestige are inseparably united. 
By Max Weber authority is identified with ruling (Her· 
rschaft). Seeing that charisma is taken to be one type of 
ruling, if my understanding is right, it seems only fair to 
conclude that prestige constitutes one kind of authority. I 
shall discuss Weber's concept of ruling later on. 
In an analysis of prestige, Leopold's interpretation is 
often cited. Leopold's interpretation is very elaborate, but 
in effect he interprets prestige as something emotional; he 
construes it as a mood which recognises superiority of value 
in a person (Mehrwertstimmung). According to him, there 
is prestige where the sentiment of value superiority of a 
person is such that it does not permit of personal judgment 
of value objectively, if it is conceived to be permitted in his 
consciousness. The value recognised by experience cannot 
constitute the source of prestige.'" That object of our 
interest which is beyond our comprehension, and which ac· 
cordingly excites in us the feeling that we cannot gain 
access to it, possesses prestige. Not so with authority. 
People are in a position to pass judgment on it. They can 
also set a rational value on it. Authority is always confined 
to certain special spheres. In these respects, there is a 
disparity between authority and prestige. Prestige does not 
postulate such appraisal, nor is it accompanied by it. It 
embodies a frame of mind, and it is engendered unconscious· 
ly. It is no other than the personification of immeasurable 
superiority recognised in the other party. Leopold attempts 
to detach prestige from the instinct of obedience, but it is 
doubtful whether this is right. It seems proper to regard it 
as one of the instances where this instinct comes into play. 
Vierkandt, while interpreting authoririty in the light of sub· 
ordination to superioty in value, admits that it is the action of 
22) Leopold, Prestige, 191e. 
-------- ---._-_.-
.---~~~ 
46 Y. TAKATA 
the instinct of obedience.'" Is it impossible to admit this in 
regard to prestige and also regarding all that dignity covers? 
Let me, however, return to my own view. In short, 
" public·grown" power represents that power only which is 
distributed by the will of the State. AI! forms of social 
power which are distributed either in the process of social 
interaction between individuals or according to the c;:onditions 
in partial societies other than the State, even though the 
authority of the State, and accordingly the order of the 
State are postulated, embody "wild-grown" power. And 
revolutionary changes in the State organization invariably take 
place when there is a sharp discrepancy between the distribu-
tion of wild-grown power and that of public·grown power. 
Between the various kinds of social power referred to, 
there operate the law of attraction and the law of absorption. 
There is a tendency for those who have acquired certain 
power in certain relations to be given power in other rela-
tions also. That is to say, all kinds of social power have a 
tendency to attract each other in seeking their common 
subject. Two reasons may be given for this tendency. One 
is the effort made by a man with power to gain other power 
by utilising his present position. The other reason is that 
unless there is special need for distributing functional power 
according to talent, new power is apt to go to a man who 
has already power in other relations; he is given new power 
commensurate with his position, that is, power already 
possessed. The social consciousness of partial societies always 
approves such a tendency. This is called the law of attrac-
tion. When one and the same subject is given various kinds 
of social power in various relations, one position is, so to 
speak, absorbed by another position, if these powers have 
different objectives and consequently they cannot be put in 
operation in the same directicn. Just as the value of a 
commodity determined by the highest use to which it can 
be put, when it has many uses, the strongest among the 
23) Vierkandt, op. dt., p. 52. 
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various powers with different objectives determines the social 
position of the subject. Only where these powers are of a 
nature to be operated in the same direction, their cumulative 
strength forms the power of the subject and determines his 
social position. As a general rule, we find that various 
social powers have their different objectives and that conse· 
quently the process of absorption operates between them. 
Such relations are called the low of absorption. 
VII 
The distribution of various kinds of power under the 
circumstances already described means, from one point of 
view, the creation of variol1s relations of power. Relations 
of power come about where the powers distributed act on . 
each other. I shall now consider the various forms of rela· 
tionship of power. To begin with, let me divide relations of 
power into those outside of organization and those inside of 
organization. 
Relations of power inside of organization are divided 
into relations of ruling and relations of leadership, according 
as the organization itself forms or does not form the basis 
of power. Relations of leadership means a relationship in 
which an individual can have others follow his lead as he 
pleases because his personality carries either dignity of some 
kind or a certain authority. In this case, those in subordi· 
nation have the consciousness of voluntarily seeking after 
value. Under this category falls the relationship of subordi· 
nation to leaders in the primitive societies or that relation· 
ship of subordination in a group which is formed with the 
leading personality as the centre and in which there is no 
occasion for the exercise of coercion by the organization be-
cause the organization naturally springs up on account of 
its leading figure, but is hardly so solid as to impress its 
members. Inside a State which already has a gigantic 
organization, leaderships can exist in a particular sphere of 
the cultural field, while in undeveloped communities, leader· 
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ship can cover, comparatively speaking, wide spheres of life 
and activity. In short, the prominent feature of relations of 
leadership is that, besides their being based on personality and 
value, the organization is supported by personal social power, 
instead of personal power ramifying from the organization. 
Where the organization itself forms the basis of power 
and accordingly the power attending the organization can 
exert coercion, if necessary, relations of power are those of 
ruling, The relation of power inside of organization, is that 
in which the essence of the will of those subordinated is 
positively determined by power; if that is the relation of 
leadership, there is felt no pressure by the organization 
because in them the subordinated members recognise the 
superiority of value in the leader. If that is the relation 
of ruling, a certain definite will is forced on those in sub· 
ordination by the power of the organization. The will of 
one side constitutes an order, while obedience to this order 
characterises the attitude of the other side. Ruling in this 
sense is divided into military or illegitimate ruling and 
legitimate ruling, according as coercion, which may be exerted 
if necessary, is based chiefly on the so·called external power 
or on internal power. The latter may be subdivided into 
emotional ruling and legal ruling. The former includes 
what Max Weber calls charismatic ruling and traditional 
ruling. The difference between charismatic ruling and leader-
ship lies in the fact that whereas in the former, pressure 
which can be forcibly exerted is inherent, no matter whether 
the organization owes its existence to a personality or not, 
and it can force the will of the ruled, in leadership, those 
in subordination are allowed to act voluntarily. In this case, 
therefore, subordination is simply found; it is not forced. 
In legal ruling, it is executed in accordance with definite 
laws and regulations or agreements, and subordination is 
secured because it is legal. Ruling in this instance is divided 
into two forms, formal-legal and rational·legal. Under the 
system of legal-ruling, the contents and directions of regula· 
tions are of intrinsic value judged by the objective standard 
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so that the subordination is shown to be spontaneous, and 
then power is exercised only to the least extent necessary 
for the controlling function. Ruling of this kind may be 
called rational·legal. This is sometimes described as a form 
in which coercive utilisation of men by other men ceases, or 
it is called simple administration (St. Simon). It may also 
be described as the conversion of ruling into management. 
Even in this case, however, coercion, if it is not actually 
exerted, is in a state to be exerted whenever necessary. In 
this sense, ruling is present. It would be wrong to say 
that ruling then becomes converted into control which is 
not ruling. There are thus five kinds of ruling: external 
or military, charismatic, traditional, formal·legal and rational· 
legal. This classification is due to the different motives 
underlying subordination in relations of ruling. 
Whereas the power relations inside of organization are 
relations of ruling or leadership, that is, a relationship of 
positive determination of will, those outside of organization 
constitute a relationship of negative determination of will, in 
other words, a relationship of subordination to the subject 
in such a way as not to obstruct the execution of his will. 
It is a relationship in which the will of people is so regulated 
as not to disturb the subject in the execution of his will. 
Such a relationship is formed, not inside of organization, but 
in interaction outside of organization, namely, in mutual 
interaction which individuals within society in its totality 
carryon, supported by their respective positions or social 
·power. A certain relationship of power comes about where 
they come into contact with each other as upholders of the 
social powers which they respectively possess. Those who 
have superior power make use of such power (utilise their 
privileges or consume their wealth) and at the same time 
gain the general regard of others. One side predominates, 
and the other side goes into subordination. Let me, for 
convenience' sake, call this a relationship of social strata. 
This relationship exists between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. In former days, it existed between peers and 
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commoners. It is commonly called class relations. Where 
they contact with each other as such, relations of ruling 
are non-existent, except in a very indirect sense. 
In case the class will of the bourgeoisie, that is, the 
group will or the will of the representative individuals of 
those who belong to the bourgeoisie, determines the policy 
of ruling the organization, it may be said that it is ruled by 
the bourgeoisie in an indirect sense. Again, those belonging 
to different classes can associate to form partial society and 
establish an organization within it. Formally, this organiza· 
tion is often based on equality, but, in reality, inequality 
rules. For instance, propertied men and proletarians can 
easily associate to form the same partial society called an 
enterprise. Although they are nominally on an equal footing 
within this enterprise, they are not in practice. In an enter· 
prise in which big business interests take part, a kind of 
relationship of ruling is brought into being. The organiza· 
tion of a big enterprise possesses a strong binding force, 
partly because of its financial power and partly because it is 
no longer dependent on the wiII of individuals. All em-
ployees are ruled by the leaders who bring this binding force 
to bear on them. In this sense, it may be said that there 
is a certain latent relationship of ruling between the bour-
geoisie and the proletariat. It is possible that the relationship 
that existed between .. static peers" (Bluntschli) and the 
common people in former times was something analogous to 
this. At any rate, there exists a kind of superiority relation-
ship (Uebermachtverhiiltnis) between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, though not the relation of ruling. 
When those belonging to the same social stratum-espe-
cially those who have interests in common-are bound to-
gather by the consciousness of a community both of interests 
and of position and form an association, prompted by the 
consciousness of hostility to those whose position and in-
terests are irreconcilable with theirs, we say that there exist 
'class relations (Klassenverhiiltnis) in a narrow sense. In 
such cases, those who belong to different social strata form 
1 
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their respective groups, which are hostile and antagonistic 
to one another. Here, a class means a group. Although 
antagonism marks their relationship, there still subsists a 
relationship of superiority between them. This class rela-
tionship in a narrow sense is no other than the class rela· 
tienship in a wide sense, such as relationship of social strata, 
which has developed the aspect of group hostility; it is very 
far from being a matter of pure interest, so that it is entirely 
erroneous to take a class for an interest group. 
Relations within an enterprise are said to be of equality, 
in so far as form is concerned. They are founded on the 
basis of demand and supply of labour. As a matter of fact, 
however, as the leaders gain power through their wealth, or 
on account of the important positions which they hold in 
management, they can deal with the employees with a cer-
tain dignity. Nor is this all. As the employees are very 
often so circumstanced that they cannot easily obtain em-
ployment elsewhere, they develop a strong sense of depen-
dence. In consequence, relations within the enterprise, which 
are formally equal, can be transformed into relations of 
command and obedience, being unable to remain as relations 
of management or the execution of will. The bigger the 
organization of the enterprise and the more difficult it is for 
the employees to obtain similar employment elsewhere, the 
more pronounced is this tendency. 
VIII 
In the light of what I have so far written, let me now 
examine what social position the proletariat and middle class 
people in the present social organization occupy and what 
social power they possess. 
In the present organization of the State, the proletariat 
are given certain power, but they get practically nothing 
from the functional distribution of power. It is true that 
people belonging to this class enter various branches of the 
Government service, but the positions which they hold are 
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of the lowest order in the hierarchy of the bureaucratic 
organization. Their official duties are merely routine and 
trivial and so it is impossible to say that they have any de· 
finite power connected with their official duties. This is the 
view which I take of petty police officials and subordinate 
clerks in Government offices. These officials can force us 
to do certain things, but it is too well known that they are 
simply acting at the bidding of their superiors in officialdom. 
On the other hand, they are all given certain rights by the 
State, irrespective of occupation. I mean the rights which 
are guaranteed them by laws and regulations and those 
which political usage recognises them to have. But these 
things do not by themselves univocally determine their 
social position. These rights merely indicate the scope within 
which their position or their general relations of power 
settle or they roughly point to their likely place in society. 
Exactly what relations of power they can build up within 
the scope thus determined depends on the operation of 
various other circumstances. 
Some sections of these people at least organise unions 
in order to protect their position and interests, as witness 
trade unions and political parties designed to promote the 
interests of the proletariat. Of course, the power of these 
organizations is not sufficiently strong to bring ahout a 
revolutionary change in the State organization, but the de· 
gree of obedience on the part of these people to the authority 
of the State must necessarily lessen to the extent to which 
they submit to a partial society which they themselves 
organize, and also to the extent of the vigour with which 
they try to press their demands on the State through this 
society. If no change occurs in their formal attitude towards 
the State, some alteration will nevertheless be noticed in the 
substance of their obedience. As they come to share in the 
power of their respective partial societies, the power which 
they exert on the people of another class is bound to in· 
crease. Even if only a section of the class belong to this 
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pOwer increased, provided the demands of the organization 
principally concern the position and interest of their class. 
Thus far concerns power which is based on an organi· 
zation and distributed in some ways by it. But what forms 
the dominant part of their power is rather power or position 
which is given them in society in the process of man·to·man 
interaction between people, or extra·organically, or, to put in 
still another way, through the intermediation of manners, 
customs and morals. For instance, in a society it is ordained 
by usage, by morals, and by custom what honorifics people 
belonging to a certain class (retail dealers, tenant farmers, 
etc., for example) should use in adressing those of another 
class, in what way they should greet them, what attitude 
they should adopt and how and when they should exchange 
presents. They are not allowed to exceed the limits of these 
unwritten rules. Besides, there are the trends of thought, 
public opinion and social movements to be considered. 
When these trends are favourable to them, who belong to 
a certain social group, the majority of the general public 
give them their moral support, with the result that their 
social power rises above what all norms guarantee them. 
At any rate, the power which the public gives them is 
conditioned by the attitude towards them on the part of 
the public which is enjoined by tradition and other circum· 
stances and by their own requirement of a certain attitude 
which they expect to be adopted. Various factors go to 
determine such attitudes, actual and expected. Regarding 
the proletariat only, their social position is of varying grades. 
Society or rather the general public adopts towards them an 
attitude which is different according to their respective 
ability (which means their personal ability, or the ability-
talent and competence-common to their group, and their 
social power also), and they, on their part, adopt a variety 
of attitudes towards those in different positions. The attitude 
which is determined by this ability, power, and sometimes 
by other cooperating factors (such as their native districts 
and pedigrees), is fixed in tradition, and it becomes modi· 
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tied by current thoughts and movements. Their abilities and 
accordingly their powers are of different degrees. They 
differ between skilled and unskilled labourers, between manual 
labourers and mental workers, and among mental workers 
of various kinds. Because of these inequalities, different 
labourers have different positions assigned them, chiefly by 
tradition, and these positions are modified in various ways 
by the workings of their organizations and by the ruling 
trends of social thought and movements. 
It cannot, of course, be denied that economic factors in 
the shape of their wages and their property, insignificant 
though they are, play their part in determining their social 
position. The action of such factors may actually be inter· 
woven into traditions and morals. The contention that the 
social position, which is influenced to some extent by wages, 
as was explained above, determines wages may sound like 
arguing in a circle, but it is not so, as a matter of fact. 
What it means is that their extra·economic power determines 
their economic conditions, and tbat the latter react on the 
former. When we analyze the extra·economic power of various 
sections of labourers, we see thatt he extent of the privileges 
given by the State (if they are given at all), the amount of 
the support or power given by partial societies other than 
the State, the degree of regard or contempt for them which 
is dictated by traditions and customs, and the extent of 
support by current ideas, as well as their training, educa· 
tion and mental ability operate together to determine it. 
Thus, there arise relations of relative strength of power 
among them.'" Those of different occupation, skilled and 
unskilled labourers, and mental and manual workers have 
their respective powers which, though analogous, are different 
from one another, and accordingly the relations of power 
corresponding spring up between them. Such relations exist 
among various classes of labourers, of course, but it must 
24) ct. Carl Brinkmann. Wirt5Chaftsform u. Lebensform. 1932, p. 7 et seq. 
What I have explained here is the starting point of my power theory in econo-
mics. 
~-~~---~-----~-------
AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POWER 55 
be remembered that these relations reflect one aspect of the 
relations of power existing between these labourers and 
people of other classes. That is to say, while representing, 
on the one hand, the relations of power between different 
sections of labourers: a" a" a",. . . . . ., such relations 
reflect one aspect of relations of power between these sec· 
tions of the proletariat and other classes: B, C, etc. From 
these circumstances, we can judge the social position of 
the proletariat, and in exactly the same way, we can also 
see what the social position of middle-class people or that 
of capitalists is like. 
When society is of an exceedingly fixed nature, its com· 
ponent members form numerous but definite strata according 
to their occupations and birth. The caste system in India 
affords a most remarkable example of this. Even in feudal 
dayS, relations of such strata, that is the relations of estates 
were fairly fixed. In present-day society, the so·called system 
of the equality of all classes before the Law is believed to 
rule.' In form, this is indeed the case, but seeing that the 
caste system and the phenomenon of social strata in feudal 
days are traceable to the fundamental circumstances con· 
nected with the existence of society and to human nature, 
the tendency to form such strata is always present, if it is 
very weak. In the interior of present-day society too, there 
exist, besides property privileges, the hierarchy of occupa· 
tions, or something like professional strata, though almost 
imperceptible in ordinary circumstances. The difference in 
the degree of regard attaching to occupations is a case in 
point. Herein, in my opinion, lie the fundamentals of the 
requirement which determines the wages of labourers and 
intellectuals. 
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